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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
David Mercer appeals following the district court’s order denying his motion for
credit for time served. On appeal, Mr. Mercer asserts that the district court erred in
denying him credit for 30 days in which he was incarcerated at the discretion of his
probation officer. Where Mr. Mercer filed his motion for credit for time served in 2016,
and the district court issued its order denying Mr. Mercer’s motions for credit for time
served on February 9, 2016, the statutory language in effect at the time the district court
re-calculated the time Mr. Mercer had served required the district court to credit
Mr. Mercer with the discretionary time he served as a condition of his probation.
Application of the amended statutes to the facts of Mr. Mercer’s motion does not require
the “retroactive” application rejected by the Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Leary, 160
Idaho 340, 372 P.3d 404 (2016), because a motion for credit for time served may be
made at any time, and Mr. Mercer’s motion was made after the effective date of the
statutory amendments. To the extent the Idaho Supreme Court in Leary may have
stated, in dicta, that the plain meaning of the statutes require that credit may only be
calculated or awarded at the same time the judgment or an order revoking probation is
entered, the Court’s statutory interpretation was flawed. Giving Mr. Mercer the credit for
the time he served as a condition of probation does not require retroactive application of
the 2015 statutory amendments, and is required by the plain language of the relevant
statutes.

1

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
On December 1, 2007, Mr. Mercer was in a one-vehicle accident. (Presentence
Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI),1 p.2.)

The vehicle Mr. Mercer was driving

crossed into the median, and rolled several times, ejecting Mr. Mercer, who ended up
underneath the vehicle. (PSI, p.2.) Mr. Mercer’s blood alcohol content was .28 at the
time of the accident. (PSI, p.2.) Mr. Mercer had twice been convicted of or pled guilty
to DUI within the last 10 years. (PSI, pp.3-4.) Based on these allegations, Mr. Mercer
was charged by information with one count of felony DUI. (R., pp.34-35.2)
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Mercer pled guilty to the felony DUI.
(R., pp.54-62.) Mr. Mercer was sentenced to a unified term of ten years, with five years
fixed, but the district court retained jurisdiction over Mr. Mercer, and, after a successful
rider, placed Mr. Mercer on probation for 10 years. (R., pp.67-71, 75-83; PSI, pp.294303.)

As a term of his probation, Mr. Mercer would serve 180 days in jail at the

discretion of his probation officer.

(R., pp.84-85.)

During his first three years on

probation, Mr. Mercer successfully completed and graduated from Blaine County Drug
Court, did not violate any terms or conditions of probation and was a model probationer.
(R., p.91.)

1

The designation “PSI” includes the PSI and all attachments contained in the electronic
file, including Addendums to the PSI, police reports, the mental health evaluation and
letters from family and friends in support of Mr. Mercer.
2
This Court ordered the district court to prepare a Limited Clerk’s Record. (See Order
to Augment Prior Appeal No. 41068, entered March 21, 2016.) The Limited Clerk’s
Record contains documents that were filed in the district court after the original Clerk’s
Record was created in the same case during a prior appeal; however, the page
numbers do not continue from that point but rather start over. Therefore, citations to the
original Clerk’s Record will include the designation “R.”, while citations to the Limited
Clerk’s Record will include the designation “Supp. R.”
2

On March 27, 2013, a Motion for Bench Warrant for Probation Violation was filed
which alleged that Mr. Mercer violated his probation by resisting and obstructing a law
enforcement officer, drinking alcohol, and using methamphetamine on three occasions.
(R., 41068, pp.117-133.) Mr. Mercer admitted that he had violated some of the terms of
his probation, and the district court revoked his probation.

(R., pp.145, 149-152;

4/25/13 Tr., p.7, Ls.2-3; 5/30/13 Tr., p.21, Ls.13-14.) On June 3, 2013, the district court
entered its order revoking probation.

(R., pp.150-152.)

The district court gave

Mr. Mercer 258 days of credit for time served. (R., p.151.)
Effective July 1, 2015, the statutes governing credit for time served were
amended to include credit for all time served as a condition of probation. See 2015
Idaho Sess. Laws, Ch. 99 (H.B. 64).
In 2016, Mr. Mercer filed a pro se Motion for Credit for Time Served and a
supporting affidavit.

(Limited Clerk’s Record (hereinafter, “Supp. R.”3), pp.39-46.)

Mr. Mercer asked for credit for the time he spent in custody serving discretionary time
and for time he spent on probation. (Supp. R., pp.42-43.) Mr. Mercer submitted an
affidavit in which he averred that he served 30 days of discretionary jail time in August
to September of 2012. (Supp. R., pp.42-43.) He attached a copy of the bill amending
the Idaho Code Sections governing credit for time served as a condition of probation.
(Supp. R., pp.45-46.) The district court denied the motion without a hearing, holding
that the statutory amendments were not retroactive according to the analysis of the
Owens Court.

(Supp. R., pp.50-52.)

The district court held that “State v. Owens

3

The designation “Supplemental Record” refers to the limited clerk’s record the Idaho
Supreme Court ordered to be augmented to No. 41068 on March 21, 2016. (Supp.
R., p.2.)

3

concluded that credit for time served is collateral and does not require retroactive
application.” (Supp. R., p.52.) The Court also held that under State v. Teal, 105 Idaho
501 (Ct. App. 1983), Mr. Mercer was not entitled to credit for time he was incarcerated
for a new offense. (Supp. R., pp.51-52.)
Mr. Mercer filed a pro se Notice of Appeal timely from the district court’s order.
(Supp. R., pp.53-57.)

4

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Mercer’s motion for credit for time served?

5

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Mercer’s Motion For Credit For Time He
Served As A Condition Of Probation
A.

Introduction
Mr. Mercer asserts that the district court erred when it denied his request for

credit for time served. Mr. Mercer asserts he is entitled to credit for the 30 days he was
incarcerated at the discretion of his probation officer. Mr. Mercer asserts that, because
the facts in the record clearly establish he is owed an additional 30 days of credit for the
time he spent in custody at the discretion of his probation officer, the district court erred
in denying his motion for credit for time served. He respectfully requests that this Court
order that he be given credit for time served in the amount of 30 days.

B.

Standard Of Review
A determination as to “[w]hether the district court properly applied the law

governing credit for time served is a question of law over which” appellate courts
exercise free review. State v. Covert, 143 Idaho 169, 170 (Ct. App. 2006). On appeal,
the appellate court will “defer to the district court’s findings of fact, however, unless
those findings are unsupported by substantial and competent evidence in the record
and are therefore clearly erroneous.” Id. An appellate court exercises free review over
questions of law. State v. O’Neill, 118 Idaho 244, 245 (1990).

C.

The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Mercer’s Motion For Credit For Time He
Served As A Condition Of Probation
Mr. Mercer asserts that the 2015 amendments to the credit statutes require the

district court to give him credit for all of the time he served as a condition of probation,
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when he was incarcerated for 30 days at the discretion of his probation officer.4 The
amendments to the two relevant statutes took effect on July 1, 2015. Because the
effective date of the amendments was before the date the district court was asked to recalculate credit for time served, the district court erred in refusing to give Mr. Mercer
credit for time served at the discretion of his probation officer.
On January 19, 2016, Mr. Mercer filed a motion for credit for time served
requesting credit for all of the time he had served on the case. (Supp. R., pp.39-40.)
Mr. Mercer also filed an affidavit in support of his motion in which he averred that he
served 30 days of discretionary time in August to September of 2012 in the Ada County
Jail. (Supp. R., pp.41-46.) The district court denied the motion on February 9, 2016.
(Supp. R., pp.50-52.) The district court acknowledged that the statutes governing credit
for time served as a condition of probation had been amended and noted that
Mr. Mercer had served 30 days at the discretion of his probation officer, but refused to
credit Mr. Mercer for that time because the statutes did not mandate credit for
discretionary time until they were amended on July 1, 2015. (Supp. R., pp.50-51.) The
district court also cited State v. Teal, 105 Idaho 501 (Ct. App. 1983) as a basis for
denying the motion, finding that Mr. Mercer “has not successfully demonstrated that the
discretionary jail time was not the result of separate criminal conduct.”

(Supp.

R., pp.51-52.)
Idaho Code Sections 18–309 and 19-2603 govern, inter alia, credit for
incarceration ordered as a condition of probation.

4

Because a motion requesting credit for time served may be brought “at any time”
pursuant to I.C.R. 35(c), credit for time served can be calculated or re-calculated at any
time. I.C.R. 35(c).
7

As amended, I.C. § 18-309(2) provides:
In computing the term of imprisonment when judgment has been withheld
and is later entered or sentence has been suspended and is later
imposed, the person against whom the judgment is entered or imposed
shall receive credit in the judgment for any period of incarceration served
as a condition of probation under the original withheld or
suspended judgment.
I.C. § 19-2603, as amended, similarly provides:
When the court finds that the defendant has violated the terms and
conditions of probation, it may, if judgment has been withheld, pronounce
any judgment which it could originally have pronounced, or, if judgment
was originally pronounced but suspended, revoke probation. The time
such person shall have been at large under such suspended sentence
shall not be counted as a part of the term of his sentence. The defendant
shall receive credit for time served from the date of service of a bench
warrant issued by the court after a finding of probable cause to believe the
defendant has violated a condition of probation, for any time served
following an arrest of the defendant pursuant to section 20-227, Idaho
Code, and for any time served as a condition of probation under the
withheld judgment or suspended sentence.
The amendments to both of the credit statutes became effective on July 1, 2015.
See 2015 Idaho Sess. Laws, Ch. 99 (H.B. 64). Where Mr. Mercer filed his motion for
credit for time served in 2016, and the district court issued its order denying
Mr. Mercer’s motion for credit for time served on February 9, 2016, the statutory
language in effect at the time the district court calculated the time Mr. Mercer had
served required the district court to credit Mr. Mercer with the discretionary time he
served as a condition of his probation.

1.

Awarding Mr. Mercer Credit For Time Served Does Not Require
Retroactive Application Of The Statutory Amendments

Application of the amended statutes to the facts of Mr. Mercer’s motion does not
require the “retroactive” application rejected by the Idaho Supreme Court in Leary

8

because a motion for credit for time served may be made at any time, and Mr. Mercer’s
motion was made after the effective date of the statutory amendments.
In State v. Leary, 160 Idaho 349, 372 P.3d 404 (2016), Mr. Leary claimed that
the district court erred by not applying the statutory amendments, which had not yet
been enacted at the time of its decision, to give credit for time served as a condition of
probation. 372 P.3d at 407. The Idaho Supreme Court rejected Mr. Leary’s arguments,
and held the 2015 amendments to I.C. §§ 18-309 and 19-2603 were unambiguous and
were not retroactive. 372 P.3d at 408. In so deciding, the Court looked at the plain
language of the statutes to hold that “the Credit Statutes do not include an express
declaration of retroactive effect.” Id. The Court went on to say that the amendment did
not apply to those “person[s] whose judgment was previously entered or imposed” and
similarly found that I.C. § 19-2603 was “devoid of any indication that it should apply to
persons who were sentenced or whose probation was revoked before the amendment
was effective.” Id. (emphasis in original).
To the extent the Idaho Supreme Court in Leary may have indicated, in dicta,
that the plain meaning of the statutes require that credit may only be calculated or
awarded at the same time the judgment or an order revoking probation is entered, the
Court’s statutory interpretation was flawed. The Leary Court’s reliance on the language
of I.C. § 18-309 (despite the absence of such language in I.C. § 19-2603), applicable to
a “person against whom the judgment is entered or imposed” as language limiting the
time during which the amendments became applicable to those persons who were
sentenced or whose probation was revoked after the amendments were effective, was
misplaced. The plain language of I.C. §§ 18-309(2) and 19-2603, in its common and

9

ordinary meaning, does not restrict a credit calculation to the time the judgment is
actually entered or the time when the suspended sentence is imposed. The language
“is entered or imposed” is not mandating when the defendant’s credit can be calculated
or given, but is describing who receives the credit. The correct application of these
statutes requires the district court to consider the law in effect at the time it considers
and decides the motion for credit for time served. Further, such an interpretation would
be consistent with the Idaho Criminal Rule allowing a court to calculate the appropriate
credit for time served at any time. See I.C.R. 35(c).
Furthermore, the facts of Leary are distinguishable from those in Mr. Mercer’s
case. In Leary, the defendant asked the Court to find error where the district court
denied the motion for credit for time served prior to the effective date of the 2015
amendments. The Court found the statutory amendments were not retroactive back to
2013, when Mr. Leary filed his motion for credit for time served and the district court
ruled on it.

Although the Idaho Supreme Court noted that the statutes were not

retroactive, and, in dicta found that the amendments would not apply to a defendant
sentenced or whose probation was revoked before the amendment was effective, the
Idaho Supreme Court has not since decided a case such as Mr. Mercer’s, where the
motion for credit was filed after the effective date of the statutes.5

5

In an unpublished decision, State v. Taylor, 2016 Unpublished Opinion, No. 647
(Aug. 18, 2016), the Idaho Court of Appeals held that “[t]he district court correctly
applied the law in effect at the time Thomas filed his motions for credit for time served.”
C.f., State v. Alvarez, 2016 WL 5416318 (Sept. 28, 2016) (unpublished) (holding that
the defendant’s credit for time served was calculated prior to the effective date of the
amendment and the application of the amendment to the credit for time served statute is
not retroactive).
10

The Court should find the amended versions of the credit for time served statutes
apply to those calculations of time served made after the amendments were effective,
and no further analysis regarding retroactivity is necessary.

2.

The Plain Language Of The 2015 Amendments Requires The District
Court To Calculate Credit Pursuant To The Amendments If They Were In
Effect At The Time Credit Was Calculated

The amendments to the credit statutes mandating that a defendant receive credit
for time spent incarcerated as a condition of his probation became effective on July 1,
2015. See 2015 Idaho Sess. Laws, Ch. 99 (H.B. 64). At the time the district court
entered its order calculating Mr. Mercer’s credit for time served, the 2015 amendments
to the credit statutes were in effect. The applicable credit for time served statutes are
not ambiguous. The plain language of the 2015 statutory amendments requires the
district court to calculate credit pursuant to the amendments if they were effective at the
time the court calculates time served.
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law, over which appellate courts
exercise free review. State v. Hart, 135 Idaho 827, 829 (2001). The Idaho Supreme
Court has outlined the following rules of statutory interpretation. “The interpretation of a
statute must begin with the literal words of the statute; those words must be given their
plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and the statute must be construed as a whole.”
Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg’l Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 893 (2011) (internal
quotation marks omitted). “A statute is ambiguous where the language is capable of
more than one reasonable construction. An unambiguous statute would have only one
reasonable interpretation.” Id. at 896 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “If
the statute is not ambiguous, this Court does not construe it, but simply follows the law
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as written.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “We have consistently held that
where statutory language is unambiguous, legislative history and other extrinsic
evidence should not be consulted for the purpose of altering the clearly expressed intent
of the legislature.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “The asserted purpose for
enacting the legislation cannot modify its plain meaning.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). Appellate courts do not have authority to revise or void “an unambiguous
statute on the ground that it is patently absurd or would produce absurd results when
construed as written.” Id. at 896. “If the statute as written is socially or otherwise
unsound, the power to correct it is legislative, not judicial.” Id. at 893 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
The language of the 2015 amendments to the credit statutes clearly require
credit for all time spent incarcerated:
In computing the term of imprisonment when judgment has been withheld
and is later entered or sentence has been suspended and is later
imposed, the person against whom the judgment is entered or imposed
shall receive credit in the judgment for any period of incarceration served
as a condition of probation under the original withheld or suspended
judgment.
...
The defendant shall receive credit for time served from the date of service
of a bench warrant issued by the court after a finding of probable cause to
believe the defendant has violated a condition of probation, for any time
served following an arrest of the defendant pursuant to section 20-227,
Idaho Code, and for any time served as a condition of probation under the
withheld judgment or suspended sentence.
2015 Idaho Sess. Laws, Ch. 99 (amending, respectively, I.C. §§ 18-309 and 19-2603)
(emphasis added).

12

A credit calculation does not necessarily occur when the district court revokes
probation pursuant to I.C. § 19-2603. The plain language of that statute provides only
that credit shall be awarded, but places no conditions on when it must be calculated.
The first sentence of the statute reads as follows, “When the court finds that the
defendant has violated the terms and conditions of probation, it may, if judgment has
been withheld, pronounce any judgment which it could originally have pronounced, or, if
judgment was originally pronounced but suspended, revoke probation.” In common
parlance, the term “when” can mean “in the event that” and is not necessarily a time
restriction.6 It is only in the third sentence that the calculation of credit for time served is
mentioned, however the plain language does not require calculation of such credit at
any date certain. The provision about when the district court revokes probation does
not impact on the credit calculation, since the credit calculation is addressed in a
different part of the statute. Thus, the use of the term “when” in the first sentence does
not create a time limitation of what time credit for time served may be calculated in the
third sentence.
Finally, the same analysis can be applied to the plain meaning of “when” in
section 18-309 because there is no provision providing that the district court may only
calculate the appropriate amount of credit for time served when entering a judgment,
whether an original judgment or an order revoking probation. See I.C.R. 33(b); see also
I.C. § 19-2519. Thus, the Idaho Criminal Rule allowing a motion to be made for a credit
calculation at any time is both necessary and consistent. As such, I.C.R. 35(c) and the
statutes governing credit for time served can be read in harmony. Furthermore, if this

6

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/when (last visited Feb. 26, 2017).
13

Court finds the term “when” is ambiguous in either statute, the rule of lenity must be
applied.7
The Idaho Criminal Rules specifically provide that a defendant may file a motion
to correct the calculation of credit at any time, thus the time the judgment is entered or
executed is not a factor to be considered in performing a credit calculation. I.C.R. 35(c).
Further, as the Idaho Court of Appeals has recently made clear, “the language of
I.C. § 18-309 is mandatory and requires that, in sentencing a criminal defendant or (as
in this case) when hearing an I.C.R. 35(c) motion for credit for time served, the court
give the appropriate credit . . . .” State v. Moore, 156 Idaho 17, 20-21 (Ct. App. 2014).
“This means that the defendant is entitled to credit for all time spent incarcerated,” as
defined by the statute.8 Id. Thus, the focus of the credit statutes is not on the judgment
itself, but rather, on the defendant—the person against whom that judgment was
entered. See also I.C. § 18-309(2) (“In computing the time of imprisonment when . . .
[the] sentence has been suspended and is later imposed, the person against whom the
judgment is entered or imposed shall receive credit in the judgment . . . .”) (emphasis
added); I.C. § 19-2603 (The defendant shall receive credit for time served . . . for any
time served as a condition of probation under the withheld judgment or suspended
sentence.”) (emphasis added).
Further, the Idaho Legislature did not include a cut-off date for the courts in
determining credit for time served. While the Legislature certainly knew of the broad

7

The rule of lenity states that in construing an ambiguous criminal statute, a court
should resolve the ambiguity in favor of the defendant. State v. Dewey, 131 Idaho 846,
847 (Ct. App. 2011).
14

language of I.C.R. 35(c) (allowing a motion for credit for time served to “be made at any
time”) and knew how to draft language specifying the date a defendant/appellant’s
conviction will be covered by the statute (See, i.e., I.C. § 19-870(a) (requiring the state
appellate public defender to provide representation to appellants “convicted on or after
September 1, 1998”), it did not do so, instead enacting statutory amendments
broadening the circumstances in which courts “shall” give credit for “any time served.”
See I.C. §§ 18-309(2), 19-2603.
Finally, the Court is obligated to ensure the defendant is receiving “credit for the
correct amount of time actually served . . . . The [courts do] not have discretion to
award credit for time served that is either more or less than that.” See Moore, 156
Idaho at 21 (emphasis added). Therefore, the Court’s dicta in Leary essentially requires
the district court to apply an improper calculation of credit due based on when the
judgment was entered or executed.
Because the effective date of the amendments was prior to the date the district
court’s order calculating credit for time served was filed, the district court erred in
refusing to give Mr. Mercer credit for time served as a condition of probation.

3.

The District Court Erred In Finding Mr. Mercer Was Not Entitled To Credit
Because His Incarceration Was Due To A New Crime

The district court alternatively held that Mr. Mercer was not entitled to credit in
this case because his incarceration was due to a new crime.

The court held,

“[d]efendant has not successfully demonstrated that the discretionary jail time was not

8

While the defendant in Moore was seeking credit for prejudgment incarceration, and
Mr. Mercer is seeking credit for time served as a condition of probation, the reasoning of
Moore applies equally to all periods of incarceration identified in the credit statutes.
15

the result of separate criminal conduct of resisting and obstructing law enforcement
officers.” (Supp. R., p.52.) Such a contention is plainly controverted by the record in
this case, where an Order of Commitment was signed by the district court on July 24,
2012, in which the district court ordered Mr. Mercer to serve 30 days of his discretionary
time and stated: “Statement of Reason(s): On July 5, 2012, the defendant was cited by
Hailey Police Officer Michael Shelamer for the misdemeanor charges of Providing False
Information to an Officer, Resisting or Obstructing Officers and Illegal Fireworks
Resulting in a Fire.” (Supp. R., pp.6, 110.) In denying Mr. Mercer credit, the district
court relied on the Court of Appeals’ decision in Teal; however, Teal is easily
distinguishable where Teal absconded from supervision, failed to notify any authorities
of his whereabouts, and then committed a felony in California. State v. Teal, 105 Idaho
at 504.

The Teal Court held that the defendant was not entitled to credit for any time

spent in prison in another state on an unrelated felony conviction during his period of
probation in Idaho. Id.
Here, Mr. Mercer’s probation officer requested, and received, permission to have
him serve 30 days of discretionary time in this case after he was cited for new
misdemeanor crimes. (R., p.110.) Mr. Mercer was incarcerated on this case, at the
request of his probation officer which is distinguishable from Teal where that defendant
was out on probation, committed a new crime in another state, and, after his return to
Idaho, sought credit for the time he was incarcerated in the other state.
Mr. Mercer is entitled to credit for all of the time he was incarcerated as a
condition of his probation. Mr. Mercer was incarcerated for an additional 30 days and is
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owed credit for time served, thus, the district court erred in denying his motion for credit
for time served.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. Mercer respectfully requests that this Court
order that he be given additional credit for time served in the amount of 30 days.
DATED this 28th day of February, 2017.

__________/s/_______________
SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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